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ABSTRACT
Housing policy evolves through programs, each created to
respond to the specific shortcomings of previous programs and
policies, and to embody the current dominant political
philosophy. In keeping with this history, the Section 8
Rental Assistance program grew out of the problems of the
Section 221(d)(3) and Section 236. Affordability in Section
221(d)(3) and Section 236 projects was provided through use
restrictions embedded in the low-interest 40 year mortgage.
The maturing of 20 year prepayment restrictions threatened the
affordability of this stock, sparking national debate that
resulted in the Low Income Housing Preservation and Resident
Homeownership Act. LIHPRHA balances the needs of tenants with
the rights of owners.
This thesis explores whether LIHPRHA, created to preserve
the very projects Section 8 was designed to replace, can
provide a preservation model for Section 8 program. Housing
experts offer divergent answers to the question: some contend
that the preservation issues are similar in both types of
subsidy programs, others insists that the two must present
different preservation issues given the inherent differences
in the two types of programs.
Differences between Section 8 and its predecessors raise
five recontracting issues: 1) the degree of choice offered
owners, 2) Section 8's disparity with other government
programs and with the market, 3) the cost of the subsidies, 4)
term limits on subsidies and use restrictions, and 5)
conflicts in HUD's role as both subsidy provider and mortgage
insurer. Resolution of these issues will occur within the
context of: 1) the experience gained implementing LIHPRHA; 2)
the dominant political philosophy at the time contracts begin
to expire; 3) the state of the real estate market; and 4)
demographics and the demand for Section 8 housing.
LIHPRHA provides a basic road map for Section 8 contract
expirations. The debates that preceded LIHPRHA honed a
philosophical orientation to preservation. LIHPRHA provides
a procedural framework for assessing preservation worth at a
project level. The experience with Section 221(d)(3) and
Section 236 programs does not, however, provide a technical
answer to the Section 8 contract expiration dilemma.
Thesis Supervisor: Langley Keyes
Title: Professor of City Planning, Dept. of Urban Studies &
Planning
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Housing policy is characterized by an evolution of
programs, each created to respond to the specific shortcomings
of previous programs and policies, and to embody the current
dominant political philosophy.' In the wake of a protracted
government withdrawal from a commitment to affordable
housing2, preservation of the existing subsidized housing
stock has become a critical concern of current housing policy.
The majority of affordable units produced over the past 30
years are privately owned and publicly subsidized. owners
promised to provide affordable units for a specified number of
years, in exchange for government subsidies to underwrite
their costs. The issue of preservation concerns the loss of
affordable stock once that initial commitment expires.
The first public/private approach to affordable housing,
employed in the Section 221(d) (3) and Section 236 programs of
the 1960s and early 1970s, reduced mortgage costs through low
interest, long term notes backed by federal mortgage
insurance. Use restrictions to insure affordable rents for
1 Allen R. Hays, The Federal Government and Urban Housing
(Albany, NY: State University of New York, 1985) 80.
2 For the purpose of this thesis, the term "affordable
housing" will refer to housing priced to accommodate tenants in
federally-defined moderate to very low income categories. Moderate
income households earn 80% to 95% of the median income; low income
household have an income at 50% to 85% of median; and very low
income households are below that level.
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moderate income tenants were embedded in 40 year mortgage with
a 20 year prepayment prohibition. By the late 1960's both
programs were plagued by high default rates as owners
struggled with mounting operating costs and stagnant tenant
incomes 3 . In keeping with historic practice of housing policy
formulation addressing the shortcomings of prior programs, the
Section 8 Rental Assistance Program4 grew out of the problems
of the Section 236 and 221(d) (3) programs5 . Under the Section
8 program, subsidies were provided from the income side rather
than the debt side, filling the gap between a fair market rent
established by HUD and the tenant's share, based on income.
Project-based rental subsidies were awarded in 20 to 40 year
contracts. The majority of new and substantially
rehabilitated projects were financed with federally insured
mortgages that had 20 year subsidy contracts and 40 year
mortgages. These mortgages remain in effect, absent any use
restrictions, after the rental subsidy ends. Projects
financed through state housing finance agencies avoid this
situation with coterminous subsidy contracts and mortgages.
3 Hays 124 - 125.
4 The Section 8 Program included three approaches to
providing rental assistance: Project-based New Construction,
Substantial Rehabilitation and Moderate Rehabilitation subsidies;
Existing subsidies, awarded directly to tenants for use in the
private market; and Loan Management Set-Aside subsidies for
troubled HUD financed projects. This thesis focuses on Project-
based subsidies. For more discussion on the Section 8 program, see
Chapter 2.
5 Hays 137.
Preservation became an issue for housing projects
developed under the Section 221(d) (3) and Section 236 programs
beginning in the early 1980s. It was at this time that
prepayment restrictions began to mature, sparking fear that
owners would choose to prepay, returning a substantial segment
of the affordable stock to the open market. A national debate
ensued over the respective rights of owners and needs of
tenants. 6 Out of this debate, and experience gained in two
emergency legislative measures 7 , grew a piece of legislation -
the Low Income Housing Preservation and Resident Homeownership
Act (LIHPRHA) - designed to "create a permanent and
comprehensive program which preserves privately owned, low
income housing projects while not unduly restricting the
owners' mortgage prepayment rights."8  Implementation of
LIHPRHA is accomplished through a lengthy, complicated, micro-
managed process.
LIHPRHA applies to most of the 508,000 units of housing9
6 "Prepayment of HUD, FmHA Mortgages Sparks Debate Among
Owners, Tenants, Others," Housing and Development Reporter (Dec.
28, 1987) 580.
7 The Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation Act of 1987,
Title II of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1987
imposed a two year moratorium, that was extended with minor
amendments for a third year.
8 "Prepayment of a HUD-Insured Mortgage by an Owner of Low
Income Housing; Interim Rule" Federal Register, Vol. 57, No. 68
(Wednesday, April 8, 1992) 24 CFR Parts 50, 219, 221, 236, 241, and
248. Summary 11992.
9 Prepayment is prohibited in projects that were developed by
non-profits, received Flexible Subsidy assistance, currently
receives Rent Supplement assistance, and certain projects that have
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produced under Section 221(d) (3) and Section 23610. On the
horizon looms the potential loss of 1,107,000 Section 8
units.1 1  Can the LIHPRHA approach work in the Section 8
program, itself created as a solution to problems in the
below-market-rate mortgage programs addressed through the
legislation? Housing experts offer views on the relevance of
LIHPRHA to Section 8 contract expirations: some contend that
the preservation issues are similar in both types of subsidy
programs, others insists that the two must present different
preservation issues since Section 8 was created to respond to
the problems and shortfalls of the Section 221(d) (3) and
Section 236 programs. Just as straight line forecasts lose
validity when the basic conditions or factors change, so do
regulatory precedents. Tenant representatives and advocates
of affordable housing12 believe there won't be a preservation
problem. These individuals suggest that LIHPRHA articulates
a commitment to, and provides a framework for, preservation.
been sold or defaulted on the mortgage during the life of the
mortgage.
10 United States, General Accounting Office, Fact Sheet for
the Chairman, Subcommittee on Employment and Housing, Committee on
Government Operations, House of Representatives, "Rental Housing:
Potential Reduction in the Privately Owned and Federally Assisted
Inventory", June 1986,: GAO/RCED-86-176FS, 6 & 7.
11 U.S. General Accounting Office 7.
12 Vince O'Donnell, Director of Development, Community
Economic Development Assistance Corporation, Boston MA, telephone
interview, June 8, 1992 and July 7, 1992; and Larry Yates
Director of Field Services, Low Income Housing Information Service,
Inc., Washington, DC, telephone interview June 8, 1992.
8
They perceive the issue as simply one of appropriations and
fully expect the Section 8 contracts to be renewed. Such
advocates generally acknowledge that renewal will most likely
be voluntary, since owners will have fulfilled all contracted
obligations. Some, however, hope for mandatory renewals.
The second group of experts 3 , generally representative
of owner interests, suggest that Section 8 contract
expirations pose substantially different issues than those
present in the expiring use restrictions regulated through
LIHPRHA. Owner representatives fear they will not have a
choice about recontracting, and that the terms and conditions
of any new contract might be less favorable than the current
program. Their concerns raise five interconnected issues and
policy resolution in one area will likely impact on the
others.
1. Climate of Renewals - Mandatory or Voluntary: Owners
suggest that the issue of voluntary or mandatory renewal,
while legally similar for both the earlier mortgage-based
programs and Section 8 projects, has substantially different
public policy implications in the case of contract renewals.
The LIHPRHA experience portends a mandatory solution.
13 Howard Cohen, Esq. and Kathleen Sheehan, Esq., Mintz,
Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C., Boston, MA, personal
interviews May 2, 1992, May 12, 1992, and July 1, 1992; David A.
Smith, President, Recapitalization Advisors, Boston, MA, personal
interview June 23, 1992; Jay Regan, Treasurer, State Street
Development Corp., Boston, MA, July 14, 1992, Marty Jones, Senior
Vice President, Corcoran Jennison Co. Inc., telephone interviews
July 23, 1992 and July 28, 1992.
However, both tenant and owner representatives see different
policy implications for intervention in the expiration of a
contract that has been completely honored and intervention in
the right to prepay a mortgage that is mid-term.
2. Section 8 Advantageous Disparity: Section 8
contracts are more generous in rent level and allowable owner
dividends than the insured-mortgage programs like the Section
221(d)(3) and Section 236 programs, leading some analysts to
critique Section 8 as a windfall for owners. The disparity
between federal programs has critical importance in relation
to the concern over mandatory or voluntary renewal. In the
absence of mandatory contract renewal, the government will
have to provide additional incentives adequate to induce
owners to voluntarily sacrifice project control. The
condition of the market when contracts expire will influence
the cost of these incentives.
3. Cost of Renewals: The parity issue raises concerns
about the cost of renewal. Some experts assert that Section
8 New Construction and Substantial Rehabilitation rents are
very high, perhaps above the federal cost limits established
in LIHPRHA 4 . Not only will the balance of cost and benefit
be at issue, but the required level of appropriations might
make Congress reluctant to refinance the program.
4. Term Length: The length of the renewal contract term,
14 Interviews with Howard Cohen, Kathleen Sheehan, Jay Regan
and Marty Jones.
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and the term of the use restrictions attached to the subsidies
will impact on owners' interest in renewal. Will the contract
and restrictions be coterminous? Renewal of Section 8 Loan
Management Set Aside subsidies indicate that contracts might
have five year terms in order to provide a palatable
appropriations price tag. Yet LIHPRHA requires use
restrictions for the balance of the useful life of the
project. owners, particularly if faced with a soft market,
fear they will approach negotiations with a government able to
require long-term use restrictions for a short-term subsidy
contract.
5. HUD Dual Role: Finally, in formulating a policy, HUD
must contend with an inherent conflict of interest in which it
is often party to both a 20 year subsidy contract, and insurer
of a 40 year private mortgage. As subsidy grantee, HUD will
negotiate for contracts at the lowest possible cost, and if
costs outweigh benefits, may not seek to renew them. As
mortgage insurer, HUD, in the guise of the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA), will want to protect the notes from
default by guaranteeing adequate income to the project. It
will want to insure the owner remains interested in the
project, and has adequate resources to cure any problem.
The range of opinion about what the future holds for
Section 8 projects highlights the importance of beginning to
explore the issue now.
Although it is true that the earliest expiration is
several years away, owners of these properties are
11
doubtlessly keenly observing the shifting rules
being applied to the earlier generation of
projects. At a minimum they confront substantial
uncertainty about the conditions under which they
will be able to sell their properties or convert
them to market-rate projects. Under these
conditions they may well assume the worst and begin
systematically pulling their equity out of the
buildings through deferred replacement investments
and limited maintenance.15
Such a result will not serve the interests of anyone involved,
not tenants, not owners, and not HUD.
This thesis will explore why there are two such different
views of what will happen when Section 8 contracts expire.
The issues at stake represent legal, public policy, and
financial considerations. Each party to a project contract -
the owner, the tenants, the government - brings a unique
desired outcome that reflects their different interests. In
part their competing concerns are driven by perceptions of,
and interest in, the conditions of recontracting, including
the degree of choice offered owners, Section 8's disparity
with other government programs and with the market, the cost
of the subsidies, and the methods used to establish term
limits on subsidies and use restrictions.
Literature is scarce on this subject, consisting
primarily of legislative history, regulations, and responses
to both. A literature review has been supplemented by
interviews with preservation experts representing both owner
and tenant perspectives, Section 8 project owners, and legal
15 Source unknown.
counsel.
Chapter one will lay a ground work for the thesis:
establishing a premise about the role of precedent in
government policy; setting a context for preservation by
making a case for the continued need for affordable housing;
and filling out the positions of each side in the debate over
Section 8 renewals. Chapter two will establish the technical
foundation for the analysis by reviewing the origin,
structure, and expiration issues of the Section 8 program.
Chapter three looks at the expiration issue in the context of
competing interests among participants. Chapter four will
evaluate each of the five issues in terms of precedent, and
relevant legal, policy, or financial considerations. Chapter
five will suggest some parameters for addressing the issue of
contract expirations. It will explore where precedents have
been established, as well as where Section 8 contract
expirations will lay new ground. The interrelationship of
these issues will likely effect the potential range of
outcomes for resolving the expiring contract problem.
CHAPTER 2
Section 8: Origin, Structure and Expiration
The Section 8 program was created to solve problems
encountered in the earlier mortgage insurance programs, and as
an expression of the New Federalism policies of then President
Nixon. This historic and philosophical background provides a
context for evaluating the program, and each participant's
understanding of the "deal". Players include the owner, the
government represented by both HUD and Congress, the lender,
and the tenant. After reviewing the history and programmatic
workings of the Section 8 program, the interests and
perceptions of each of these players in relation to the
Section 8 contract will be explored. This background provides
a foundation for analyzing the contract expiration issue.
The Insured Mortgage Programs:
The Section 8 program was a response to the difficulties
plaguing the Section 221(d) (3) and Section 236 programs. Both
of these programs had employed similar strategies: reduced
financing costs achieved through below-market-rate federally
insured mortgages were translated into lower rents for low and
moderate income tenants. The Section 221(d)(3) Below Market
Interest Rate (BMIR) program, active between 1961 and 1968,
was designed to serve moderate income tenants, bridging the
income gap between public housing tenants and the Market. It
provided an upfront subsidy to reduce interest rates to 3
percent on privately written, FHA subsidized 40 year
mortgages, in exchange for rent caps and obligation to rent to
tenants with moderate incomes (for the most part 80 - 95% of
median income for the area) 16 ; for-profit owners accepted
limits on distribution of surplus funds at 6% of equity, and
were permitted to prepay the mortgage at year 20; non-profit
owners received 100 percent financing, and were not allowed to
prepay or distribute surplus funds. 17
In 1968 the Section 236 program replaced Section
221(d) (3), remaining active until 1973. It provided subsidies
to reduce mortgage interest rates to 1 percent in exchange for
limits on rents. Tenant incomes were targeted to below 80
percent of median, slightly lower than the Section 221(d) (3);
very low income tenant rents were assisted through the Rent
Supplement Program. Returns on equity in the Section 236
program were limited to 6 percent, as in the Section 221(d) (3)
program.
By 1970, problems began to threaten projects developed
under both the insured mortgage programs.
Steady upward pressure on costs and rents reduced
the potential market of eligible tenants,
preventing the most needy families form benefiting
from the program, and created an additional
incentive for project managers to skimp on
16 National Low Income Housing Preservation Commission,
Preventing the Disappearance Of Low-Income Housing (Washington, DC:
1988) 1.
17 National Low Income Housing Preservation Commission 87.
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maintenance and services.18
In addition, the foreclosure rates were rising rapidly.
Problems in the Section 236 program, as well as associated
problems in the Section 235 and public housing programs set
the stage for President Nixon's housing moratorium in 1973 and
the legislation that was to emerge in its wake.
Over the course of Nixon's first term in office
(beginning in 1968), his orientation to domestic programs
became increasingly conservative9 . In contrast to Nixon's
conservatism, Congress maintained a strong liberal base20.
Nixon's opposition to the mortgage programs was countered by
strong Congressional support for expansion of the housing
programs. In contrast, Nixon supported only the Section 23
Leased Housing Program which was based on subsidized rental in
the private market21 .
The Origins of Section 8:
After an 18 month long housing moratorium, President
Nixon agreed to reopen a federal role in housing22. The
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 was the result
18 Hays 125.
19 Hays 108 - 110.
20 Hays 108.
21 Hays 140.
22 Nixon housing concessions were made in an attempt to
increase popularity and stave off impeachment proceedings. Hays
146.
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of compromise reached two days before Nixon resigned, and was
signed into law by the new President Gerald Ford23. The Act
signaled a significant redirection of federal housing policy
with the creation of the Section 8 Rental Assistance Program.
Unlike the earlier FHA-insurance programs that relied on low-
interest mortgages, the Section 8 program provided rental
assistance subsidies to tenants to make housing affordable.
The direct subsidy of tenants' rent was a clear reaction to
the income problems that had plagued preceding programs. The
program guaranteed rental income at a fair market price
established by HUD, with the tenant paying only that portion
equal to 25% of their income.
The original Section 8 program was composed of three
variations on a single theme, similar primarily in their
impact on participating tenants' housing cost. The Project-
based Section 8 program was designed to stimulate production,
with subsidies attached to units. Initially, it had two
components, New Construction and Substantial Rehabilitation.
In 1978 a moderate rehabilitation component was added24. The
second variation, the Existing program, provided subsidies
directly to tenants for use in the private market. The third
variation, the Loan Management Set Aside (LMSA) program,
provided subsidies to projects developed through earlier
mortgage-insurance programs (the Section 221(d) (3) and Section
17
23 Hays 146.
24 Hays 146.
236 programs). While each represents an important policy
initiative, this thesis focuses on the preservation of the
project-based New Construction and Substantial Rehabilitation
program.
Under Section 8 the tenant's share of rent was set at 25
percent of that tenant's income, for households earning under
80 percent of the area median. Eligibility requirements were
fairly broad since Section 8 was intended as both a low and
moderate income programs. It was designed to avoid both the
exclusion of low income people, a charge leveled at Section
236 programs, and the concentration of very low income people
found in public housing Mixed income projects, combining
subsidized and market-rate units, were given priority in new
construction programs. 25 The subsidy for each household was
to fill the gap between the tenant's share and a reasonable
'economic rent' for the unit which HUD established based on
building costs, age, and amenities. Economic rents were not
permitted to exceed limits known as Fair Market Rents (FMR),
an amount based on rents in comparable units of that
particular size and type in the project's geographic area.
"FMR's ran substantially higher for New Construction than for
units in the Existing Housing program." 26  The Section 8
statute also gave HUD officials the authority to set the rents
in individual projects as much as 20 percent higher than local
25 Hays 147.
26 Hays 158.
FMRs, if warranted by market conditions.
Project based subsidy contracts were written with 20 to
40 year terms. Prior to 1980 they also provided five-year
renewal periods, allowing the owner to "opt-out" of the
program before the contract expired. Renewal was simply a
roll-over of the original contract. Contract renewal resulted
in no change in terms, although new contracts were governed by
changed rules limiting distribution of surplus cash dividends
and prohibiting five year opt-outs. "HUD experience [has
been] that relatively few of the owners eligible to opt out of
Section 8 contracts actually [have done] so. More often, HUD
[has been] besieged by owners wanting to renew expiring
contracts. ,27
It was initially anticipated that the HUD approval
and rent subsidy contract would be sufficient
guarantees of project soundness to attract private
mortgage money. However, private lenders proved
reluctant to get involved on this basis alone, and
the program was increasingly linked to other forms
of government subsidy and guarantees.28
The Tandem Plan, authorized in 1974, providing traditional
GNMA (Government National Mortgage Association or Ginnie Mae)
below-market mortgage writedowns, was frequently used29.
27 "Payment of HUD, FmHA Mortgages Sparks Debate Among Owners,
Tenants, Others," Housing Development Reporter, Vol. 15, No.32,
580.
28 Hays 148.
29 The Tandem program, authorized by the Brooke-Cranston Act
of 1974, authorized GNMA to "purchase below-market-rate mortgages
from private lenders at par - above what those loans were worth ont
he market" - and resell them "at their true discounted value to
Fannie Mae. The net effect of buying at par and selling at a
19
Section 221(d)(4), an FHA insurance program originally
designed for unsubsidized units in high risk areas, was also
paired with Section 8 contracts30 . Additional sources of
financing included local housing authority-issued bonds, and
state housing fiance agencies, receiving special set-aside of
subsidies.
From a policy perspective the Section 8 program reflected
the differences between the philosophy of the Nixon
Administration and the Johnson Administration's vision of a
Great Society. Where Johnson's War on Poverty emphasized
direct federal leadership and control in housing, Nixon's New
Federalism emphasized reduced regulation and unfettered
profits for private owners. Rent limits and tenant income
eligibility standards constituted the only real restrictions
on project management. The public/private partnership
programs developed in the earlier era, the Section 221(d)(3)
and Section 236 mortgage insurance programs, have restricted
project dividend distributions as well as rent levels and
tenant incomes.
Developers who contracted to build or rehabilitate
a project received a guarantee of virtually 100
percent occupancy at a fair rent as well as some
ability to choose tenants.. .However, the real key
to participation on the supply side lay imbedded in
discount was a financing subsidy by the federal government over and
above the operating cost assistance..." David Listokin 165. Also
see Hays 148.
30 David Listokin, "Federal Housing Policy and Preservation:
Historical Evolution, Patterns, and Implications," Housing Policy
Debate vol. 2, issue 2, 1991, 165.
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the U.S. tax code"3'
In particular, accelerated depreciation and the
deductibility of mortgage interest were made available to
developers, thereby encouraging tax syndication. These
federal income tax incentives encouraged private participation
in affordable housing production, and offered an avenue to
further subsidize development.
The Section 8 program was slow to get started.
It took over a year for HUD to develop and
promulgate regulations and for local agencies and
developers to gain a clear enough understanding of
the new rules to apply in large numbers. Thus,
Section 8 did not begin to make a major
contribution until 1976.32
Once "initial glitches" were ironed out, however, the program
went into high gear. Construction of new units began to rise
rapidly after 1977. The Substantial Rehabilitation program
began to have visible role in 1977, but did not contribute a
significant number of units.
By 1980, the Section 8 program was revised to include
limits on owner dividends. In 1981 Section 8 eligibility was
redefined to target very low income households, below 50
percent of median, and rent was raised to 30 percent of
income, signalling the conservative shift in housing policy.
Federal emphasis shifted in 1982, from the supply side to the
31 Karl E. Case, "Investors, Developers, and Supply-Side
Subsidies: How Much is Enough?," Housing Policy Debate, Vol. 2,
Issue 2 (Fannie Mae Office of Housing Policy Research) 342.
32 Hays 150.
demand side, signalling the end of the New Construction and
Substantial Rehabilitation programs. The President's
Commission on Housing declared that:
Today.... the largest problem is not the quality of
housing in which most people live but its
affordability... The purpose of federal housing
programs should be to help people, not to build
projects."33
Production ceased to play a significant role in national
housing policy after this time, with a promise of resumption
only coming seven years later with the Cranston-Gonzales
National Affordable Housing Act of 1990.
The Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983,
which terminated authorization of the Section 8 New
Construction and Substantial Rehabilitation
programs, effectively set a ceiling on the number
of privately owned housing units that would be
contractually reserved for non-elderly, non-
handicapped, low-income households. Thereafter,
the number of such units could only decline.34
It is quite difficult to secure a consistent count of the
productive capacity of each federal program. The production
and removal of units necessitates a snapshot count rather than
a measure of total production. Further, the layering of
subsidies (for example, in one Section 2321(d)(3) project
Section 8 Loan Management Set-Aside subsidies might have
replaced Rent Supplements, which in turn had replaced Flexible
Subsidies) make it difficult to attribute production results.
33 David Listokin 166.
3* Anthony J. Blackburn, "Tax and Direct Expenditures:
Perspectives On Prepayment Proposals," Housing Policy Debate, Vol.
2, Issue 2, 329.
In fiscal year 1985 a General Accounting Office inventory of
privately owned rental units with project-based federal
assistance counted a total of 1,890,000 units; 347,000 units
(18%) were characterized as HUD-insured and assisted
inventory; 820,000 units (43%) were Section 8 New
Construction, Substantial Rehabilitation and Moderate
Rehabilitation inventory; 287,000 units (15%) classified by
GAO as Section 8 inventory but also reasonably a part of the
HUD insured inventory, included Loan Management Set-Aside
projects, HUD property disposition projects, and rent
supplement conversion projects. The balance of 436,000 units
(23%) were comprised of FmHA Section 515 multi-family
inventory and HUD-held inventory. The Section 8 project-based
stock was heavily weighted with 614,000 New Construction
units; Substantial Rehabilitation program contributed 114,000
units, and the Moderate Rehabilitation program represented
92,000 units. 35 The point of all these numbers is that during
a short period of time, the Section 8 production programs had
"generated the most units of subsidized housing produced in
the United States in a short period of time." 3 6 The potential
loss of over three-quarters of a million Section 8 units, or
35 United Stated General Accounting Office, Fact Sheet for the
Chairman, Subcommittee on Employment and Housing, Committee on
Government Operations, House of Representatives, "Rental Housing:
Potential Reduction in the Privately Owned and Federally Assisted
Inventory", June 1986 (GAO/RCED-86-176FS) 6 & 7.
36 National Anti-Displacement Project, Low Income Housing
Information Service, "Section 8: Projects At Risk of Conversion,"
Special Memorandum, (Washington DC: LIHIS, August 1990) 8.
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more realistically, even a significant percentage of the
units, will have a dramatic impact on the stock of housing
affordable to low income people.
Section 8 Expirations:
Project-based Section 8 contracts will expire in four
successive waves, reflecting both the date the programs were
put into effect and the term lengths typical of each
program.37  The first wave will be the expiration of Loan
Management Set-Aside contracts added to projects developed
under the earlier mortgage insurance programs. This wave will
be strong throughout the decade of the 90s, peaking in the
last five years. The LMSA program represents about 390,000
units38 . The second wave of Section 8 contract expirations
will be in the Moderate Rehabilitation program. Almost all of
the contracts on the 12,700 Moderate Rehab units will expire
between 1995 and 2004. The third and largest wave will be
the expiration of contracts in the Section 8 New Construction
program. Forty-four percent of these units will expire in
the period 2000-2004, with significant expirations both before
and after that period. Approximately 680,000 units from the
New Construction program will be expiring. "The bulk of these
37 National Anti-Displacement Project LIHIS, 8-9.
3 These numbers are based on a 1990 count which differs from
the 1985 GAO inventory both due to actual changes in the stock and
methods of counting projects with multiple subsidies. Source:
Anti-Displacement Project LIHIS, 8-9.
24
units are in fairly good condition and without major financial
problem. . "39. The fourth wave will be the expiration of the
Substantial Rehabilitation contracts, representing 122,500
units. These expirations will also peak in the period 2000-
2004, but there will be relatively more expirations after that
period than under the New program. "Like the New
construction program, this program has provided a generally
well-maintained stock of badly needed affordable housing40 .
The majority of the Section 8 project-based rental assistance
contracts will be expiring in the next 15 years, between 1990
and 2005.
39 National Anti-Displacement Project LIHIS, 5 - 6.
40 National Anti-Displacement Project LIHIS, 5 - 6.
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CHAPTER 3
Expiration in the Context of Competing Interests
Larry Yates, Director of Field Services for the Low
Income Housing Information Service, has stated that the
Section 8 "dilemma can be resolved with a minimum of conflict
or it can be ignored, with catastrophic results."4 1 By 1992
he declared the problem resolved42. The HUD insured-mortgage
prepayment alarm of Section 221(d) (3) and Section 236 was
sounded by tenant advocates. As observed earlier, they
believe the Section 8 contract expiration will not present
significant preservation problems: Contracts will simply be
renewed. Since LIHPRHA represented new restrictions on
owners, it is this group that is more likely to sound the next
preservation warning bell.
To understand why there are differing views about the
future of Section 8 contract renewal, it is necessary to look
at the motivations of each of the participants in a Section 8
project. There are four parties involved in each project:
the owner, the tenant, the government, and the lender. A
fifth party, usually not directly involved but critical to the
project, is Congress, through creation of program and
appropriation of funds. Each party brings a set of interests
that will inform their approach to the contract expiration.
41 National Anti-Displacement Project, LIHIS, 5.
42 Interview with Larry Yates.
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Owners:
To Owners, Section 8 subsidies represent a strong and
reliable cash stream. Owners of New Construction projects
contracted before November 1979, and Substantial
Rehabilitation projects contracted before January 1980 have
the further advantage of no limits on distribution of surplus
cash as dividends.43  For owner's, the major interest is to
maximize returns, both in the form of annual dividends and the
residual value of property. In any renewal situation, the
owner will want to retain as much flexibility as possible,
maximizing their ability to respond to market changes.
When existing contracts expire, assuming a voluntary
renewal process, a number of factors will govern an owner's
actions. Some will simply want out of the subsidized housing
business, disenchanted with the administrative requirements,
regulatory changes, or management of housing for the targeted
population." Most will be governed by a desire to maximize
the profitability of the project, weighing four primary
factors. Those are:
1. Restrictions on Use Embedded in the Mortgage: Projects
financed through State Housing Finance Agencies or Public
Housing Authority-backed bonds may have use restrictions and
prepayment prohibitions that will influence contract renewal
43 "Section 8 Contracts Revised to Reflect New Regulations,
Enforcement Alternatives," Housing Development Reporter-Vol.8, no.
16, 311.
" Interview with David Smith and Howard Cohen.
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decisions. Most FHA insured financing - either through the
Tandem Plan or Section 221(d)(4) - does not contain
restrictions, allowing the owner to maintain the favorable
financing terms regardless of whether or not the project is
used as affordable housing.
2. Value of the Property in the Market: In projects with
market value that exceeds the value that could be gained
through the Section 8 contract, the owner has incentive to
walk away from renewal options. In such a case, many owners
already indicate they would accept vouchers provided to low
income tenants to allow them to gradually transition out of
building. 45
3. Tax Consequences: Where a plan to maximize the value
of the property involves a sale, tax consequences will be a
factor in weighing profitability. Many projects will face
capital gains tax on a fully depreciated property.
4. Value of New Subsidy Contracts: New Section 8
contract renewals will also be evaluated against the
property's value in the market. Important terms of the
contract in this comparison include rent level, method of
calculating increases, limits on dividends, stipulations
regarding residual receipts accounts, use restrictions tied to
the contract and length of the contract. 46 In projects that
have operated with dividend restrictions (contracted after the
45 Interview with Howard Cohen and David Smith.
46 Interview with Jay Regan.
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1979 regulatory change), access to any existing residuals
account will also be critical.
Tenants:
Tenants are primarily concerned with the preservation of
their homes, and tenant advocates with the preservation of
affordable units. Preservation is particularly critical in the
case of Section 8 units, since they serve low and very low
income tenants, and units are typically better than found in
comparably priced (to the tenant) public housing projects.
Larry Yates, of the National Low Income Housing Information
Service, believes that "Congress will continue to appropriate
funds for [Section 8 renewals]; there is a clear consensus
about their importance. The result of lost units would be
more explicitly harmful than in EUR projects, because Section
8 subsidies serve very poor people.
Larry Yates cautions, however, that if the owner comes to
the legitimate end of his or her contract, Congress hasn't
been able to find a way to require the owner to stay in.
Tenant control over their housing through home ownership or
non-profit ownership, an important objective that found
support in the LIHPRHA legislation, is not as viable for
Section 8 projects. 47
47 Interview with Larry Yates.
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HUD:
As representative of both the subsidy and the mortgage
insurance, HUD brings sometimes conflicting interests to the
discussion. As a lender and mortgage insurer, HUD's Federal
Housing Administration is interested in protecting the
security of the mortgage. This is particularly true given the
recent history of FHA multifamily programs.
At this point, the losses in the FHA multifamily
mortgage insurance programs have been well
publicized... From our interviews, it is clear that
many experts believe that the problems with the
multifamily insurance programs had much less to do
with the design of the programs or the risks
inherent in rental housing than with HUD's
inability to manage the programs.48
FHA will want to preserve adequate profitability to insure the
owner remains interested in, and committed to the project.
The Agency will also want to insure that the owner has
adequate personal worth to support the project should any
problems arise.
As a subsidy provider, HUD incorporates three
potentially conflicting interests: 1) preserving units for low
and very low income units; 2) being "fair" to owner; and 3)
doing both in a cost-effective manner.
The Secretary of HUD is ultimately responsible for
creating a coherent department policy between the subsidy and
mortgage divisions. As a member of President's cabinet, the
48 Denise DiPasquale and Jean L. Cummings, "Accessing Capital
Markets for Affordable Rental Housing, A Report to the Low and
Moderate-Income Housing Finance Task Force," December 1990, Joint
Center for Housing Studies, Harvard University, 33.
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policy should reflect the philosophy of the current
administration. All federal multifamily housing programs fall
under the auspices of the Assistant Secretary for Housing (the
Federal Housing Commissioner) . The respective subsidy and
mortgage interests will be represented by the commissioner's
deputy assistance secretary for multifamily housing programs,
with responsibility for the Section 8 production programs, and
the deputy assistant secretary responsible for mortgage
activity.
The Private Lender:
The private lender in a federally insured mortgage is
neutral to the consequences of contract renewal. The lender's
investment is protected by the FHA insurance, shifting all
risk back to HUD.
Congress:
Congress is a critical player. It must pass the
legislation and appropriate funds for any renewal program.
This dual role of creating the ground rules and allocating the
resources makes it appropriate, then, that Congress take
responsibility for resolving the complex web of interests that
defy neat distillation. Legislators must interpret and
represent the public good. They must balance the need to
create and maintain affordable housing, their obligations to
developers, and for balancing the budget. They must be
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responsive to requests for support from individual owners and
tenant groups. Owners may represent important financial
support, and tenants can represent large blocks of voters.
The range of interests represented by the parties involved in
a Section 8 project will determine the scope of the debate
over the contract renewal process. The issues will concern
the contractual context - voluntary or mandatory - for
renewal, the terms of the contract, including rent level,
method for determining increases, restrictions imposed on the
project, and contract length. Both HUD and Congress will have
to weigh the cost, political and financial, with the benefit
of preserving the housing. The final solution must satisfy
the financial, legal, and policy perspectives encompassed by
these issues.
Under the much less than ideal conditions now
prevailing, with no replacement project-based
housing available and with no buy out arrangements
in place, it is apparent that federal policy must
attempt, as a matter of political necessity, to
limit the extent of prepayment by the owners of
subsidized projects over the next few years.49
49 Anthony J. Blackburn, "Tax and direct Expenditures:
Perspectives On Prepayment Proposals," Housing Policy Debate, Vol.
2, Issue 2 (Fannie Mae Office of Housing Policy Research) 337.
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CHAPTER 4
Five Preservation Issues for Section 8
The divergent prophecies concerning the fate of Section
8 contract renewals stem from different perceptions of the
preservation issues involved in such recontracting. Five
issues mark the difference between the potential Section 8
recontracting and Congress's policy for Section 221 (d) (3) and
Section 236 preservation as expressed by LIHPRHA:
1) owner choice in recontracting;
2) parity between Section 8 contract terms and incentives
and other federal programs;
3) meeting the cost of new subsidies;
4) term or length of the new contract - both subsidy and
use-restrictions, and correspondence between length of
subsidy and use-restrictions; and
5) reconciliation of HUD's conflicting interests as
subsidy provider and mortgage insurer.
The final plan will grow from answers to these
questions, based on the economic and political climate at the
time of expirations, as well as the philosophical perspectives
guiding housing policy. The most important lessons for
Section 8 recontracting will come from the experience of
implementing LIHPRHA. Although too early to assess its
shortcomings, an examination of the approach to preservation
taken in LIHPRHA provides a framework for looking at Section
8 issues. Other precedents set during the evolution of the
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Section 8 program also provides valuable information.
Finally, it is helpful to look at the legal issues, public
policy and economic implications that will guide a
recontracting plan.
Any preservation plan is grounded in a premise of a
continuing need for affordable housing not met by development
of new stock. 50 Further, preservation policies are imbedded
in the current anti-production policies. If policy makers
take on a renewed commitment to production, affordable units
lost to expiring Section 8 contracts might be replaced. Many
housing professionals contend that a production orientation is
a far healthier response, both for creating vital projects and
for stimulating the economy. Robert Kuehn, a private
50 Preservation of existing affordable housing has become a
necessary priority in the wake of the federal withdrawal from a
commitment to housing, expressed both through the erosion of
funding and through the 1986 Tax Reform Act, which substantially
removed tax incentives for affordable housing development.
"America is increasingly divided into two nations: first a
nation of housing 'haves,' and second a nation of housing 'have-
nots. ' Most Americans are well housed and enjoyed the benefits of
continued economic growth, but the prosperity of these Americans
does not reflect the plight of the growing number of low- and
moderate income households." William C. Apgar, "The Nation's
Housing: A Review of Past Trends and Future Prospects for Housing
in America," Building Foundations: Housing and Federal Policy, ed.
Denise DiPasquale and Langley C. Keyes (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1990) 25.
Summarizing the findings reported in The State of the Nation's
Housing: 1991, William Apgar, Jr. observed "[T]he current
recession and real estate slump have done little to ease the
nation's housing affordability problems. Moreover, once the long-
awaited economic recovery takes hold, home prices and rents will
move up again, further limiting the housing opportunities of the
nation's poor. " Karen Wiener, "The Crisis Isn't Over; The
Continued Need for Affordable Housing in Massachusetts," (Boston:
Citizens Housing and Planning Association, 1991) Forward.
affordable housing developer, argues that preservation efforts
misdirect the need for a dynamic economy. From his view, the
task is to produce in order to creates vitality and avoid
developing stagnant stereotypes of certain stock as "low-
income. ,,51
Nonetheless, federal government has largely abandoned
production of affordable housing over the last decade. At
this stage, absent a dramatic shift in national housing
policy, preservation is the only means of maintaining the
existing stock of affordable housing.
Mandatory or Voluntary Renewals: The Legal Context:
Owners suggest that the mandatory compliance with LIHPRHA
required by Section 221(d) (3) and Section 236 projects may not
offer an appropriate model for Section 8 contract expirations.
They concede that the legal issues may be similar, but assert
that there are significant policy difference between the two
preservation scenarios.
LIHPRHA requires owners of projects under its
jurisdiction to participate in a highly regulated process that
significantly modifies their ability to exercise a contractual
right to prepay. Emily Achtenberg, noted expert on expiring
use restrictions, notes that as a result of several potential
"exit-points" in the process, "LIHPRHA is not a mandatory
51 Robert Kuehn, President, Keen Development Co., personal
interview, July 20, 1992.
preservation program."52 owners are allowed to pre-pay if such
action would have no adverse impact, the market value exceeds
the preservation value, HUD is unable to fund preservation
incentives within a specified time period, or there is no
willing or able purchaser. Such exit-points do not, however,
relieve an owner of the duty to comply with the LIHPRHA
process. A critical issue facing Section 8 recontracting is
whether a similar process will be imposed on project owners,
and if one is, whether it will be voluntary or mandatory. The
legal context appears similar in both instances - grounded in
53
the Fifth Amendment "takings" provisions
Under LIHPRHA, only the right to prepay is disturbed.
The balance of the mortgage remains intact. The loss of this
right is compensated through incentives offered in LIHPRHA.
The preservation issue in the Section 8 context occurs after
the completion of the contract, rather than at a point midway
through the contract. When Section 8 contracts expire, all
relationships will be severed between owner and government.
To force recontracting raises Fifth Amendment due process
concerns and poses a number of public policy dilemmas.
Marty Jones, former HUD Multifamily Property
Representative, currently Senior Vice President at Corcoran
52 Emily P. Achtenberg, Preserving Expiring Use Restriction
Projects in Massachusetts: A Handbook For Tenant Advocates,
Community Groups and Public Officials Interim Edition (Boston:
Citizens Housing and Planning Association, 1991) 1-6, 1-7.
53 Interview with Howard Cohen.
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Jennison Co., Inc., speculates that there may be significantly
different expectations of residual value for Section 8
projects that will translate into a greater willingness to
test mandatory provisions in court. She believes that the
historic poor location and maintenance of Section 221(d)(3)
and Section 236 projects reflect owners' anticipation of
little additional value at the prepayment date. The shifting
perception of potential residual value, according to Jones,
can be seen in the significantly better location, construction
and maintenance of Section 8 projects. Such expectations, if
supported by market potential, may make a big difference in
how owners respond to contract expirations.54
Legal challenges to the LIHPRHA predecessor statute, the
Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation Act or ELIHPA, offer
insight into claims that might be brought against a mandatory
recontracting in Section 8. In Orrego v. U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development 5 the Illinois District Court
upheld the constitutionality of ELIHPA. At issue in Orrego
was a request by residents in a Section 221(d) (3) project that
a prepayment of the mortgage be voided under provisions of the
ELIHPA legislation. In arguing that ELIHPA unconstitutionally
limited his prepayment option, the owner argued that it
violated the Contracts Clause, denied due process rights, and
54 Interview with Marty Jones.
55 Orrego v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
701 F.Supp. 1384 (N.D. ILL. 1988).
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constituted an illegal taking.
The Court rejected each of these assertions. First, it
found that by its own terms, the Contracts Clause did not
apply to the federal government 56 . The owner's claim of a
constitutionally protected substantive right to prepay was
also dismissed. In examining this issue, the Court held that
Congressional legislation "adjusting the burdens and benefits
of economic life" are presumed constitutional 57 . The Court
went on to say that a statute will withstand such scrutiny if
"Congress enacts it pursuant to a rational legislative
purpose, in a manner that is neither harsh nor oppressive."58
The Emergency Preservation Act was enacted by Congress to
"maintain the level of low income housing available under
federal programs, and the Act therefore fulfills a legitimate
government concern other than saving the government money. "59
The prepayment provision was "simply part of a regulatory
program over which Congress retained authority to amend in the
exercise of its power to provide for the general welfare."60
Finally, the court ruled that the Act did not work an
unconstitutional taking of property under the Fifth Amendment
56 U.S.A. Constitution, Article I, Section 10, cl. 1 says, "no
state shall ...pass any. .. Laws impairing the obligations of
Contracts... " (emphasis added).
57 201 F. Supp. 1395.
58 701 F. Supp. 1395.
59 701 F. Supp. 1396.
60 701 F. Supp. 1397.
because it "did not unconstitutionally deprive" the owner "of
a property right." The owner will continue to own the
property, and receive a reasonable return on its
investment.61  In sum, the Court concluded that Section
221(d) (3) and Section 236 owners have no absolute right to
prepayment.
Mandatory Section 8 recontracting would likely involve
similar claims, according to Howard Cohen, an attorney
specializing in subsidized housing. 62 Cohen argues that the
real difference between prepayment and contract expiration
lies not in the law, but in public policy implications.
From a policy perspective, mandatory recontracting looks
like more than a simple taking. It might more aptly be
compared to conscription, since required "labor" in the form
of ongoing management is required of owners. Yet,
conscription might still be acceptable if it were necessary to
achieve a particularly important public purpose.
Conscription of unwilling parties has practical
disadvantages. It can be costly if the work to be done
involved extensive discretion or judgement calls. Compulsory
recontracting that provoked hostility from owners could
require costly monitoring to insure fulfillment of the public
purpose. Section 8 contracts already require many aspects of
61 701. F.Supp. 1396.
62 Interview with Howard Cohen.
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management 6 3 , including:
- restrictions on tenant income levels;
- consent to comply with the provisions of the Section 8
regulations and other associated federal rules and
regulations that establish tenant/landlord
relationship restrictions, including stronger non-
discrimination, and tenant protection requirements
than most states impose on private owners;
- restricted rent levels, and possibly profit caps.
Thus to insure that projects comply with both the spirit
and letter of the Section 8 program HUD could be forced to
undertake a high level of monitoring in a setting of mandatory
recontracting.
Monitoring would also be complicated by the very nature
of the business. Management is concerned with very concrete
product oriented things: physical management, including
property maintenance, fiscal management and administrative
compliance; but it is also concerned with process issues: the
interaction with tenants, establishing a place in the
community, creating the ambiance of project. Product is easy
to monitor. It is far more difficult to regulate the process
aspects of management.
Since 1960s it has been a public policy goal to encourage
private profit motivated ownership of affordable housing. The
63 National Housing Law Project, The Subsidized Housing
Handbook, (Berkley, CA: NHLP, 1981) 1.2.
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rational for this approach has been to harness the cost-
effective productive capacity of the private sector6 and
overcome the perceived inefficiencies and obvious problems of
public housing. Private ownership was thought to be more
efficient than public ownership, and the involvement of the
private sector was hoped to increase public support for the
government programs.
Yet private developers charge that the intensity of
regulation attendant to most government programs hampers the
possibility of achieving any efficiency. Further, owners
complain of changing rules, citing the Tax Reform Act of 1986
and LIHPRHA as the most egregious examples. David Smith,
President of ReCapitalization Advisors, Inc. of Boston, and
national expert on recapitalizing subsidized housing, claims
that "Contracts with the government are often unilaterally
renegotiated."65  The premium for legislative risk becomes
quite high with such a history, further forcing
developers/investors to maximize profits early in a deal.
This intensifies the traditional business maximum that "sooner
64 Margery Austin Turner and Veronica M. Reed, Housing
America: Learning from the Past, Planning for the Future;
(Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 1990) p?. and also David A.
Smith, "Subsidized Housing Preservation: Where It Came From, Where
Its Going," Real Estate Finance vol.7, no. 3 (Fall 1990) 14.
65 Interview with David Smith. Smith makes a stronger
argument in a 1990 Real Estate Finance article, claiming
"Congress's actions have convinced property owners that developing
government-assisted housing is foolish" the government always
changes the rules to the owner's disadvantage." "Subsidized
Housing Preservation: Where It Came From, Where Its Going," 16.
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is better than latter". Constantly changing rules also
undermines faith in government contracts and support for
programs. Smith argues that "If the government permits the
economic confiscation of..[insured mortgage projects]...
because it lacks the political will to pay for what it wants,
it will shut itself out of the private market. "6 The courts
have express similar sentiments.
The need for mutual fair dealing is no less
required in contracts to which the government is
party, than in any other commercial
arrangement.. .To say to these appellants, 'The joke
is on you. You shouldn't have trusted us" is
hardly worthy of our great government.67
These tensions suggest that the private/public partnership as
a model for producing and preserving affordable housing may
have run its course.
One means of ending public/private tensions is for
government to simply seek a different kind of partner. There
is some recent indication that public policy is shifting to
favor non-profit ownership, reflecting sentiment that private
profit motives and public purpose are not entirely compatible.
The Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act offers
an unprecedented role for non-profits in producing and
managing affordable housing. Writing for National Multi
6 David A. Smith, 17.
67 Maxima Corp. v. United States, no. 86-1292 (1st Cir. 1988)
(quoting St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States. 368 U.S. 208, 229
(1961); from David Smith, "Syndication Topics: The Emergency Low-
Income Housing Preservation Act of 1987: Good Intentions, Terrible
Law," Real Estate Review Vol. 19, No. 1 (Spring 1989) 17 - 18.
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Housing Council, Richard Hugh attributes this policy tilt to
the growing capacity and strong lobby of non-profits, but most
significantly to policy conflicts over expiring use issues,
"Compounded by the HUD influence-peddling scandals, the
failure of large FHA co-insurers, the collapse of major
syndicators.. .have culminated in a burgeoning distrust of the
motives of the private for-profit sector."6
Another route around the mandatory renewal obstacle
might be to legislate rent limits in Section 8 projects, with
incentives available in the form of subsidies to insure that
owners were able to receive a fair return. This carrot and
stick approach circumvents judicial hesitancy at imposing a
contract on owners, yet achieves the low income housing
preservation goal.69
Disparity In Section 8 Profitability:
LIHPRHA provides several incentives for owners to
preserve the affordability of their projects. Owner
profitability is encouraged under the new law by establishing
rent ceilings and dividend limits at higher level than allowed
in the original mortgage instrument. Rental subsidies
6 Richard J. High, "Feds Turn Toward Non-Profits, National
Multi Housing Council 34.
69 Lawrence Bacow, Esq., Chairman, Interdepartmental Degree
Program in Real Estate Development, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, personal interview July 14, 1992; Henry Korman, Esq.,
Staff Attorney, Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, personal
interview, July 17, 1992.
guarantee income and dividends are offered a measure of
protection through provisions that allow them to be paid out
prior to replacement reserve set-asides. Section 8 contracts
already pay relatively high rents and dividends are simply
unregulated, at least for pre-1979 New Construction and pre-
1980 Substantial Rehabilitation projects. If LIHPRHA is to be
the model for resolving the Section 8 contract expiration
problems, policy makers will have to decide whether this
disparity between the Section 221(d) (3) and Section 236
programs, and the Section 8 program will be corrected or
continued.
Section 8 project-based rents are often significantly
above rents in other private subsidized units, and above the
market, according to owners surveyed70 . They claim that rents
often exceed the ceilings established in LIHPRHA. 7 1 High rents
in these projects were justified by high construction costs in
inflationary times. Rents were "increased like clock work"
through an Annual Automatic Adjustment Factor (AAAF) .
Recontracting, therefore, raises questions about initial rent
levels and adjustment mechanisms. Marty Jones points out that
two years ago, during the real estate boom, rents were in line
with the market. She observes that "The market is so lousy
70 Interviews with Marty Jones, Jay Regan and Howard Cohen.
71 Interviews with Howard Cohen, David Smith, Jay Regan.
72 Interview with David Smith.
now, its hard not to be above it."73
Further, the Section 8 program does not limits
distribution of annual surplus cash-flow on New Construction
projects contracted prior to November 1979, or Substantial
Rehabilitation projects contracted before January 1980.
Regulatory changes in 1979 and 1980 added restrictions on
owner profitability for Section 8 projects constructed after
those dates, bringing them in line with other subsidy
programs. Nevertheless, recontracting raises questions about
whether the favorable disparity for older projects will be
maintained or eliminated to conform to LIHPRHA and other
subsidy programs.
LIHPRHA establishes clear guidelines about what
constitutes a fair return, and how to determine the upper
limit for rent. Rents may not exceed the federal cost limit,
defined as the greater of 120% of the Section 8 Fair Market
Rent or 120% of the "prevailing rents in the relevant local
market area. "74  Rents must also provide adequate income to
support debt service on the original insured mortgage, any
rehabilitation loans, project operating expenses, adequate
reserves, and a "fair return" for owners who choose to forego
prepayment in favor of the preservation incentives. If
required income exceeds federal cost limits, the project will
have to undergo a mandatory sale, resulting in loss of the
3 Interview with Marty Jones.
74 LIHIS 3 - 4.
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affordable units .
"Owners cannot receive a higher amount of incentives than
'can be supported by a projected income stream equal to the
federal cost limit. '",76 For projects which qualify for
LIHPRHA incentives, annual rent adjustments will be made by
applying an automatic annual adjustment factor (similar to the
process utilized in Section 8) set by HUD. The authorized
dividend distribution under LIHPRHA is limited to 8% return on
"preservation equity"77 . The Act also guarantees an income,
allowing the dividend to be distributed before payment into
mandatory operating reserves.78  The resolution of
the disparity issue will depend on both changes in the economy
and the dominant political philosophy when the contracts begin
to expire. If LIHPRHA's goal of "maximum preservation of
stock at minimum achievable cost"tN remains the aim in the
Section 8 context, then the concept of a maximum "upset" price
beyond which government should not go simply to preserve a
7 LIHIS 5.
76 LIHIS 5.
7 Preservation equity establishes a new owner equity sum to
reflect appreciation. Basically it represents the fair market
value at the highest and best use for residential purposes if the
property is to be preserved for low income use, or general highest
and best use if the property is to be sold; less debt secured by
the property.
78 LIHIS 7-8.
9 Kenneth R. Harney, "Introduction to Session 3; Estimating
the Costs: Perspectives on Preservation of the Nation's Lower
Income Housing Stock," Housing Policy Debate Vol. 2, No. 2, 324.
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project8 should still hold. However, the measure of the
maximum price will depend on the state of the rental market
when contracts begin to expire, and on the value placed on
preservation. A policy shift in favor of a strong production
program, for example, will reduce the value of preservation by
adding new affordable units to existing stock. In such an
environment, the upset price might be measured by the cost
replacing a subsidized project-based unit rather than in
relation to the cost of subsidizing rents in the market. If
the goals driving housing policy extend beyond merely
providing affordable units to include such aims as expanding
or upgrading the housing stock, creating jobs, or directing
the location of low-income housing, the "minimum achievable
cost" simply may not be a deciding factor.
The increased regulation of Section 8 dividends in 1979
and 1980 reflect corrections as the program matured. This
fits the model of programs evolving in response to
shortcomings, and provides a precedent for imposing
restrictions at recontracting. Given this historical context,
owners interviewed for this thesis were philosophical about
the potential reduction in project profitability at
recontracting. Jay Regan, Treasurer at State Street
Development Company, anticipates some type of regulation, and
hopes the federal government will be fair and reasonable. He
assumes renewal will not be at the same level.
8 Kenneth Harney 323.
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The Cost of Recontracting:
The cost of recontracting must survive two tests. First,
it must be deemed a reasonable price for the housing provided.
Second, it must engage the political will of Congress. This
last issue itself has two components: Congress's willingness
to appropriate money, and whether preservation is politically
palatable to congressional constituencies. Under LIHPRHA
reasonable price is measured by a cost limit test, discussed
previously, and a windfall profits test designed to prevent
incentives from being granted to projects where market
conditions alone are expected to prevent prepayment by the
owner. Specifically, the windfall profits test is designed to
insure preservation incentives are not granted, 1) when
adequate low cost housing is available in the private market;
2) the abundant supply of market units prevents conversion;
unless 3) the government desires to accomplish other public
purposes through preservation.81
While the concept of a ceiling on rents could be applied
to Section 8 recontracting, the actual limits established in
LIHPRHA might prevent preservation because they are lower than
rents currently paid under Section 8 contract.
Jones and Regan, owners of elderly projects, note that
the majority of current Section 8 tenants are elderly, and all
are low income82. Both expressed the opinion that concern
81 LIHIS 15.
82 Interviews with Marty Jones and Jay Regan.
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for elderly tenants will moderate both owner and government
positions. Jones summed up the issue: owners find it
difficult to evict elderly tenants and the popularity of
programs for the elderly will increase pressure on Congress to
appropriate funds.
Incentives provided in LIHPRHA have not been put to the
full appropriations test. Concern has been raised about
Congressional willingness to appropriate adequate funds for
the years with maximum prepayment costs. In May 1991, Bruce
J. Katz, senior counsel for the Senate housing subcommittee,
indicated there would be sufficient funding for the prepayment
program in fiscal 1992, but "the $2.6 billion that HUD says is
needed in fiscal 1993 is another matter... "183 Vince
O'Donnell, Director of Development at the Community Economic
Development Assistance Corporation, and an expert in
preservation issues, expects that the overlay of the current
economy with regulations which tie preservation incentives to
appraised property value will encourage owners to postpone
undertaking the LIHPRHA process until the economy improves.
Thus, the cost of incentives would rise as the real estate
market improves.
Section 8 contracts, on the other hand, will expire on a
set date. There will not be a 20 year period during which
owners can exercise a renewal option. Reallocations for the
83 "Housing Preservation: Resident Focus in Prepayment Rule
An attempt to Level Field, HUD Says," Housing Development Reporter
(May 27, 1991) 4.
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Section 8 program must be made in the space of ten years. In
addition, costs will be higher because the Section 8 program
represents far more preservation units than are eligible to
prepay under the mortgage insurance programs.
Term Length:
Term length for Section 8 renewals will be governed by
restraints imposed by the federal budget process. The total
cost authorized for multi-year programs is charged against
budget limits for the first year, rather than against actual
outlays for each fiscal year of operations. "In renewing
funds for Section 8s the battle is over budget authority,"
observes the Anti-Displacement Project of the Low Income
Housing Information Service. 4
The appropriations constraint limited the term of Section
8 Loan Management Set-Aside (LMSA) contracts renewals - a pool
of subsidies provided to previous insured-mortgage properties
facing financial difficulties - to five year terms. Congress
had indicated a willingness to renew the contracts in a like-
kind/like-term manner, that is, with the original conditions
and for the original term; It was unable to do so because of
the cost of appropriations.85 Congress did make a commitment
8 Anti-Displacement Project of the Low Income Housing
Information Service, "Expiring Section 8 Contracts: Renewing the
Promise of Affordable Housing," Special Memorandum, (Washington,
DC: LIHIS, 1990) 6.
85 National Anti-Displacement Project LIHIS 8.
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to continue to renew LMSA subsidies in five year increments.
Although the LMSA renewals indicate some willingness on the
part of Congress, there are significant differences between
LMSA subsidies and New Construction and Substantial
Rehabilitation subsidies. First, the rents for LMSA subsidies
are lower since the initial cost of Section 221(d) (3) and
Section 236 projects were markedly below the cost of Section
8 New Construction and Substantial Rehabilitation projects.
Second, projects with LMSA subsidies limit dividends through
the original mortgage, removing any incentive to maintain high
rents.
Use restrictions under LIHPRHA do not correspond to
subsidy commitments or mortgages. Instead, in exchange for
preservation incentives, owners must preserve the housing's
low and moderated income character for its remaining useful
life (at least fifty years) with adequate income for
maintenance and operations. This extension of use
restrictions beyond the direct provision of government
resource reflects a shift in policy perspective regarding the
benefits the government expects from its investments. Current
thinking, as expressed in LIHPRHA, is that capital
contributions should reap benefit for the full life of that
project. operating subsidies present a somewhat different
question that will have to be explored.
If these two precedents were carried forward into Section
8 LIHIS 7-8.
8 recontracting, owners might be offered five year subsidy
contracts, albeit with a Congressional promise of rollovers,
and fifty year use-restrictions written as covenants that flow
with the land. As discussed earlier, owners assume a high
degree of legislative risk in any dealing with government
programs. A rollover commitment would appear to offer little
comfort to owners facing such a trade off. However, a soft
market when contracts expire would place HUD in a strong
position to negotiate tough terms, should it so choose.
Dual Role of HUD:
HUD will enter contract negotiations constrained by its
conflicting position as subsidy provider and insurer of the
mortgage. Section 8 New Construction and Substantial
Rehabilitation project with federally insured mortgages were
principally written with 20 year subsidy contracts and 40 year
mortgage notes. At year 20 the majority of the original
mortgage will remain to be paid 7 . HUD, in its role as
lender through FHA, will want to protect this note from
87 Marty Jones offered three projects as illustration of the
mortgage balance due in year 20 on a 40 year GNMA Tandem Plan
mortgage with a 7.5% interest rate: Keystone Properties, a 220
units elderly development, had an original mortgage of
$37,900/unit, in year 20 the mortgage balance is $30,500. Cobble
Hill, a 224 mixed family/elderly project began with a $54,100/unit
mortgage, and will owe $43,200/unit in year 20. Millbrook Square,
with 146 elderly units began with a mortgage of $50,100/unit, will
have a balance of $39,800/unit in year 20. In each of these
projects, approximately 80 percent of the original mortgage
remained to be paid at the end of 20 years of amortization.
Interview with Marty Jones.
default by insuring adequate income to the project to cover
debt and operating expenses, and to provide sufficient profits
to maintain the owner's interest. HUD's role as Section 8
subsidy provider, conversely, will be to negotiate the lowest
possible cost, and if costs outweigh benefits, to forego
recontracting. This inherent conflict will blunt HUD's
ability to negotiate the lowest cost subsidy contract.
Tension between FHA and the balance of HUD is notorious,
dating back to 1965 when FHA came under HUD's jurisdiction.8
Jones, formerly on the HUD Region I staff, points out that
policy decision of this significance will be made at the level
of the Secretary and Congress, bypassing the traditional line-
staff animosities.
8 Interviews with Marty Jones; Langley Keyes, Professor,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, July 15, 1992.
53
CHAPTER 5
questions and Solutions:
Philosophical, Procedural, Technical
In many respects, the experience of preserving Section
221(d)(3) and Section 236 projects does provide a basic road
map for looking at Section 8 contract expirations. The
debates that preceded legislation for the two earlier programs
honed a philosophical orientation to preservation that
balances the needs of tenants with the rights of owners.
LIHPRHA provides a procedural framework for assessing
preservation worth at a project level. The experience with
Section 221(d) (3) and Section 236 programs does not, however,
provide a technical answer to the Section 8 contract
expiration dilemma. This is as expected, given the inherent
differences in the program, stemming from Section 8's creation
to correct problems in the Section 221(d)(3) and Section 236
programs.
The seriousness of the technical differences should not
be minimized, for Section 8 presents unique preservation
challenges. This thesis has examined five issues that grow
out of the differences between Section 8 and its predecessors.
How each of these issues plays out when contracts expire will
depend on four sets of variables.
1. Experience Implementing LIHPRHA: LIHPRHA regulations
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have yet to be put to the test.89 Implementation will reveal
shortcomings that will guide formulation of Section 8
preservation.
2. Dominant Political Philosophy: By the time Section 8
New Construction and Substantial Rehabilitation contracts
begin to expire in 19969 the Unites States may face a far
different political landscape than currently exists.
Presidential elections in the fall of 1992 and 1996 hold
promise of shifts in policy at the Executive level, as do
biannual Congressional elections. A strong federal housing
production program could obviate the need for preservation as
a strategy for insuring adequate affordable housing stock.
3. Economy and Real Estate: Similarly, in the
intervening four years, the economy may shift rapidly, as is
exemplified by the past four years of boom and bust cycles.
A strong real estate market will increase the market value of
projects, raising the price tag for preservation. By the same
token, a soft market will strengthen the government's hand in
negotiating concessions on price and use restrictions when
recontracting.
4. Demographics and the Demand for Section 8 Housing:
The bulk of contracts expire in the five years preceding 2006,
the year baby boomers begin to turn 60. This aging of the
89 Regulations issued April 8, 1992 are only four months old
at this writing.
9 178 New Constructions units will expire in 1995, a sum too
small to garner national attention.
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population will create an explosion in demand for elderly
housing at both a market and affordable rate. Marty Jones
notes that Section 8 housing is predominantly elderly, and by
design often included significant common space, making it ripe
for conversion to assisted living communities.91
Although the 20 year trend of a widening disparity in
incomes does not promise to abate, the level of demand for
affordable housing may shift. A burgeoning low income elderly
population might increase pressure on the government to
preserve Section 8 projects. Increased demand and a powerful
elder lobby could raise the threshold of a palatable price tag
for preservation.
These four variables provide a context for examining the
five issues related to differences in the Section 8 program
and the insured-mortgage programs, drawing conclusions about
how recontracting might proceed.
Context for Recontracting: Mandatory or Voluntary: The
legality of a mandatory recontracting does not appear to be a
central issue. Just as the Court ruled in Orrego that ELIHPA
did not constitute an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth
Amendment, mandatory recontracting would similarly no be
unconstitutional according to an attorney specializing in this
area of law. However, such a taking would likely engender more
legal challenges than did ELIHPA and LIHPRHA, given the
91 Interview with Mary Jones;
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generally higher residual value Section 8 properties 92 . As a
policy issue, however, mandatory recontracting looks very
different from prepayment prohibitions. Such a policy would
have to demonstrate sufficient public purpose to justify
conscripting owners into signing contract renewals to provide
and manage housing. This policy poses practical problems:
monitoring compliance of an unwilling party to a contract can
be costly and difficult. Further, mandatory renewal works
against the public policy goal of encouraging public/private
partnerships. Finally, the courts are reluctant to mandate
affirmative action93 , and so might be reluctant to require a
contract be signed.
These issues surrounding "mandatory" renewal can be
approached in three ways: First, incentives can be designed
to attract an adequate level of voluntary owner participation
to insure housing preservation goals are met. Second, a
carrot and stick approach can be employed by regulating tenant
rents when contracts expire and offering owners the option of
a subsidy renewal, thereby avoiding mandatory recontracting
yet insuring rents remain affordable. Third, the preservation
issue may signal that the public/private-for-profit
partnership has run its course. Housing policy evolution may
look to partners with more compatible goals. The emergence of
priority for non-profits under LIHPRHA may signal this shift
92 Interview with Marty Jones.
93 Interviews with Lawrence Bacow and Henry Korman.
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in perspective.
Disparity in Section 8 Profitability:
Limits on rents and owner dividends under the original
Section 221(d)(3) and Section 236 programs were repeated in
the LIHPRHA legislation. In contrast, the Section 8 program
has high, although limited, rents, and on many of its
projects, unlimited dividends. Policy makers will have to
decide whether to correct or continue this disparity in
profitability between Section 8 and the insured-mortgage
programs when designing contract renewals. Precedent set in
the 1979/1980 Section 8 regulatory changes to limit dividends,
and in LIHPRHA, indicate that public policy values some limit
on owner profitability. This bodes for restrictions, balanced
by concern for FHA-insured mortgages, and, under voluntary
renewal, owner willingness to accept significantly lower
returns.
Cost of Recontracting:
LIHPRHA applies two tests to evaluate the level of
incentives necessary to insure projects continue to serve low
and moderate income people while providing owners with an 8
percent return on equity. The federal cost limit test sets a
maximum "upset price" and the windfall profits test insures
that incentives are reasonable. The formula is expected to
work, in part, because Section 221(d)(3) and Section 236
projects were, from present perspective relatively inexpensive
to build and therefore do not carry enormous debt.
Section 8 projects, however, were comparatively expensive
and the recontracting issue emerges half way through the
mortgage amortization, with a substantial majority of the
original debt still to be paid. If a measure of comparability
in operating costs is presumed, then the significantly higher
debt on Section 8 projects will produce far more units that
exceed the LIHPRHA cost limits. Although the technical
application of the federal cost limit and windfall profits
test may not work for Section 8, the process of regulating an
"upset price" after which incentives exceed a reasonable cost,
is applicable to Section 8 renewals.
Term Length:
A significant barrier to Section 8 recontracting will be
the cost of appropriating funds for the full term of the
contract. Requirements that funds be drawn against the
federal budget in the years in which they are authorized,
rather than expended, will serve to limit the term length of
renewal. Precedent with Section 8 LMSA contract renewals
points to five year contracts with a promise to recontract at
the end of that period. A substantial issue for owners is the
precedent established under LIHPRHA to extend use-restrictions
beyond the provision of subsidy. Negotiations over the
relative length of use-restriction and contracts terms will be
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resolved in the context of the relative strength of owners and
HUD in recontracting.
Dual Role of HUD:
HUD's dual role as subsidy provider and mortgage insurer
will constrain its negotiating position in recontracting.
Traditional tensions between FHA and the balance of HUD
surface in the Section 8 contract expiration. While, the
importance of the Section 8 housing stock insure that the
conflict will be resolved as a policy decision formulated by
the Secretary of HUD and Congress, the resolution of that
conflict and the implementation emerging from it cannot help
but be impacted by the dual institutional role.
Just as the Section 8 program was built on the lessons
and shortcomings of the Section 221(d) (3) and Section 236
programs, so too will a preservation plan for Section 8 be
built on the lessons and shortcomings of the LIHPRHA process.
As stated in Chapter 1, U.S. housing policy evolves through
programs, each created to respond to the specific shortcomings
of previous programs, and to the dominant political
philosophy. The solution to Section 8 contract expirations
will not be an exception to this rule.
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